SHELL Revisited: Cognitive Loading and Effects of Digitized Flight Deck Automation by Miller, Mark D & Holley, Sam
Publications 
2018 
SHELL Revisited: Cognitive Loading and Effects of Digitized Flight 
Deck Automation 
Mark D. Miller 
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, millmark@erau.edu 
Sam Holley 
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, holle710@erau.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.erau.edu/publication 
 Part of the Aviation Safety and Security Commons, and the Human Factors Psychology Commons 
Scholarly Commons Citation 
Miller, M. D., & Holley, S. (2018). SHELL Revisited: Cognitive Loading and Effects of Digitized Flight Deck 
Automation. Advances in Neuroergonomics and Cognitive Engineering, 586(). https://doi.org/10.1007/
978-3-319-60642-2_9 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in 
Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact 
commons@erau.edu. 
SHELL Revisited: Cognitive Loading
and Effects of Digitized Flight Deck
Automation
Mark Miller and Sam Holley(&)
College of Aeronautics, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University Worldwide,
Daytona Beach, FL, USA
sam.holley@erau.edu
Abstract. Acknowledging the SHELL human factors model, authors examine
interfaces among components and assess problems created when the model is
aligned with modern digitized flight deck systems. Complacency and over-
reliance on automated systems are evaluated, and cognitive load and potential
for degraded situational awareness are examined. Authors present a SHELL
overlay demonstrating where particular digitized functions and operations pre-
sent challenges to operators and markedly influence effective SHELL interac-
tions in highly complex flight deck systems. Human factors contributing to the
Asiana Flight 214 accident are examined and correlates identified with the
SHELL analysis. Implications for advanced crew resource management are
presented, and human centered system training applications are proposed for
addressing the workload challenges. Implications for working and prospective
memory functions are examined, along with accompanying biases. Potential for
adaptive automation technology concludes the SHELL overlay analysis with
potential for reducing cognitive overload in the digitized flight deck
environment.
Keywords: SHELL  Digitized flight deck  Human factors  Working
memory  Crew resource management
1 Introduction
The technological world we live in is currently issuing the next generation of computer
power and the aviation industry has been taking full advantage of both computer
automation and information in the cockpit in the new millennia. With all these mar-
velous technologies working together, the industry has improved greatly in terms of
safety and efficiency. Pilots can do more in the cockpit with less man power and
companies can save money in terms of man power and training. However, as the
industry has made giant strides with computer technology, one accident like the 2013
Asiana Airlines Flight 214 crash in San Francisco can be a sobering reminder that even
with the best equipment and computers at hand (a Boeing 777), human error can still
win the day. Accidents that are investigated by the National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB) like the Asiana Flight 214 crash are thoroughly processed using a
meticulous scientific method of elimination to determine safety causation. The vast
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majority of the time the NTSB has no problem narrowing down the culprit to a
Probable Cause and then supports that Probable Cause with many human factors
causations that contributed to that accident. In the case of the Asiana Flight 214 crash,
the NTSB could not come up with one Probable Cause, but instead drew on several
different opinions for Probable Causes from a slew of human factors computer
automation errors that all contributed to the accident. Why the NTSB had such a
difficult time in addressing the Probable Cause of this accident can be analyzed through
an older tool of human factors analysis called the SHELL. The SHELL model was
developed into a building block structure by Hawkens in 1984 [1] and has been in use
since the 1980’s to analyze human factors and human error in aviation. By using an
updated model of the SHELL in 2017, new light can be shed into the effects of the
many editions of the computer on human factors in the cockpit and the many cognitive
issues caused by them.
2 The SHELL Model Revisited
The SHELL model of human factors analysis that Hawkins presented had the simple
block layout of centering the human as represented by the Liveware (L) in the center
and surrounding it by four other human factors interfaces: Software (S), Hardware (H),
Environment (E) and Liveware (L) as in Fig. 1.
There was a time when aircraft had very few, if any, computers in the cockpit for
automation and information usage to the pilots represented at the center of the SHELL,
but over the last 30 years computers related to automation and information have slowly
started to crowd the SHELL model’s interfaces as indicated by the red surrounding the
center Liveware (L) in Fig. 1. Surprisingly, it is not just the Hardware (H)-Liveware
(L) interface where computers have invaded in the form of flight controls to disrupt that
direct flow in the ergonomic design of the man-machine interface. In 2017, the com-
puter is now involved in all Liveware interfaces. Multiple computers are now used in
all the SHELL interfaces to include the new era of the Electronic Flight Bag
(EFB) which has been introduced to aviation cockpits in the last decade. A closer
examination of each interface will demonstrate how prolific the computer has become
in the cockpit.
Fig. 1. SHELL model updated for 2017 with Liveware/Plus highlighted [1]
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2.1 The SHELL Model 2017 and the (L)-(H) Interface
The Liveware (L)-Hardware (H) interface shown in Fig. 1. represents all the physical
elements of the aircraft and the system including such things as: the wing of the
aircraft, the control surfaces along with the entire hydraulic systems, the flight controls
in the cockpit. Every part of an aircraft physically falls into this category, but none is a
more direct connection than the ergonomic man – machine interface found in the
cockpit. It is there where the crew not only utilizes the flight controls, but also con-
tinually assesses data in the form of displays to manipulate those controls. The com-
puter has been integrated in the form of automation in the flight controls and the fuel
systems to tightly manage the aircrafts control inputs and flight envelope. At the same
time the pilots observe the digitalized computer flight information to insure the com-
puter is maintaining the appropriate parameters. This automation and information has
formed a well-managed barrier in the Liveware (L)-Hardware (H) interface that is
depicted in Fig. 2.
This computer barrier insists that the human work through it to manage the aircraft
flight controls indirectly. By doing so the computer is now doing most of the flying
thus eliminating a large amount of the direct human interaction. The ergonomic idea
behind this is to limit the human’s direct control of the aircraft as much as possible to
prevent human error and inefficiency. The computer maintains the safe flight envelope
and flies the best profile to conserve the most fuel. Here is where the flight management
system and auto-throttle join the basic flight computer configuration in the increasing of
the controllability of the aircraft. The use of fly by wire controls also has the potential to
eliminate the pilot’s direct feel for what the aircraft controls are doing and forces the
pilot to manage the flight controls by visual reference only. Doing so can make the new
Fig. 2. The SHELL model 2017 with computer automation and information displayed by Miller
in 2016 [2]
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Liveware (L)-Hardware(H) flight control interface optical only. This is flight in the new
ergonomically designed human-computer interaction loop by using the optical channel
and calls for the pilot to manage the computer to fly the aircraft. The computer is now
dominating this interface and it certainly has the potential of flying the aircraft by itself
as demonstrated by the many Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) flying today.
2.2 The (L)-(E) Interface
The second interface to be dominated by the computer historically is that of the
Liveware (L)-Environment (E) as depicted in Fig. 1. This interface is all about man’s
relationship to the different types of environment of the flight. This environment
includes both inside the aircraft and outside the aircraft and is multifaceted by including
such things as: the temperature, cabin pressure, day time, night time, and the weather.
The huge growth of the commercial industry internationally after World War II was
greatly aided by advent of the Jet age which boasted the safer, efficient and more
reliable jet engine, but shifted the causation of most accidents to be human error
related. Many of these human errors have been found to be related to the Liveware (L)-
Environment (E) interface in four forms: flying the aircraft into terrain, flying the
aircraft into another aircraft, flying the aircraft in bad weather and loss of control. To
counteract the high numbers of accidents and fatalities, the industry became committed
to reducing them by enhancing the Liveware (L)-Environment (E) interface with safety
computer technologies in the cockpit in a campaign to reduce human error. This started
with the Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) to prevent aircraft from Con-
trolled Flight into Terrain (CFIT). With the skies becoming more crowded, the next
safety device added was designed to prevent other aircraft from flying into one another
and was called Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS). With the all-weather flight
capabilities in aircraft and the demand to fly in all types of weather, the industry
eventually adopted Airborne Weather Radar to increase safety from the common
hazards in the aviation weather environment. Stick shakers were added for Stall
Warning. GPWS, TCAS, Airborne Weather Radar and Stall Warning are all tremen-
dous safety devices and they have greatly enhanced aviation safety globally over the
last 30 years. At the same time, they are all taking up room in the Liveware (L)-
Environment (E) interface as computer generated emergency information to avoid
hazards. Adding these with other important computers like the Inertial Navigation
System that allow aircraft to navigate from point A to point B in the environment with
enhanced computer navigation equipment and the Liveware (L)-Environment (E) in-
terface becomes even more crowded as depicted in Fig. 2. Future Air Traffic Control
Systems computers will soon be added to the cockpit in the form of Automatic
Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B).
2.3 The (L)-(S) Interface
With the Liveware (L)-Hardware (H) interface and the Liveware (L)-Environment
(E) interface filled with computers it would seem to be difficult to add more computer
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power to the Liveware (L)-Software (S) interface. When looking at the original
Liveware (L)-Software (S) interface as depicted in Fig. 1, its main purpose was to
cover everything that is non-physical used in the aviation system. This is a wide range
of materials which includes such things as: procedures, maps, publications, documents,
checklists and approach plates. These materials called for a hefty storage space in
pilots’ flight bags that they would carry with them in the cockpit. The invention of the
I-pad would quickly change that allowing everything in those weighty bags to be
carried on board electronically by the pilot in what is now called the Electronic Flight
Bag (EFB). The Liveware (L)-Software (S) interface was no stranger to computer
information, as most modern commercial cockpits produce plenty of computerized
information that is digitized in nice LCD screens. However, in the new age of the EFB,
all other important flight information that pilots had to carry with them in paper form is
now adding more computer information to the Liveware (L)-Software (S) interface as
depicted in Fig. 2. This is not only affecting the commercial industry as the EFB is a
tremendous step forward for General Aviation (GA) pilots as they are loading every-
thing they can with Jeppesen software into their own EFB’s. The advent of pad and
smart phone computer technologies taking the form of the EFB have also coincided
with the rise of another technology that will offer up what may be the biggest change to
come in the SHELL 2017 interfaces related to computers. Surprisingly, this one will be
played out in the Liveware (L)–Liveware(L) interface.
2.4 The (L)-(L) Interface
The Liveware (L)-Liveware(L) interface accounts for the human interactions that occur
in the flight. This can be between the cockpit crew and air traffic control or the cockpit
crew and the flight attendants, but most often it focuses in on the heart of flying the
aircraft and how the actual flying crew is interacting with one another. The industry has
made giant strides in moving from a cockpit paradigm where the Captain was con-
sidered god in the cockpit (used up until the 1980s) to a paradigm that focuses on
teamwork that is now called Advanced Crew Resource Management (ACRM). The
new model focuses on tenants that include: communication, assertiveness, manage-
ment, task delegation, teamwork, leadership/followership and decision making [3].
Although the computer related safety and efficiency enhancements have had a profound
impact on human factors in the cockpit over the last 37 years; it is the non-computer
human factors safety program of ACRM that has also had a strong impact to safety and
efficiency through the Liveware (L)-Liveware(L) interface. Through this method of
teamwork in the cockpit, many of the potential human errors in the Liveware (L)-
Liveware(L) interface are being dealt with. However, the strong potential usage of
EFB’s and ADS-B digitized communication through the computer brings with it a
whole new realm of communicating in the cockpit. Instead of communicating with
radio, the computer technologies that are now in the cockpit offer a substitute from the
radio called digitalized messaging. In terms of NextGen Air Traffic Control tech-
nologies this is called “Datalink”. This is essentially the same as texting, but is now
accomplished from the cockpit. Aircrew are now able to communicate to others outside
the cockpit through digital messaging on the computer. Although the industry is at the
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beginning of implementing this new form of communication, it will be only a matter of
time before this new way of communicating through the computer impacts the industry
and ACRM. Certainly texting has changed the way people communicate on the ground
profoundly. At the same time, it also surprised society by how dangerous it can be if
done while driving. How big this computerized communication will become in aviation
is something that only time will tell, however its existence and legitimacy as planned in
NextGen make it very real. With digitalized communications affecting the Liveware
(L)-Liveware (L) interface and the EFB transforming the Liveware (L)-Software
(S) interface, the SHELL model has been completely transformed in all interfaces in
2017.
3 The SHELL Model 2017 and Asiana Flight 214
The repercussions of this new SHELL model to aviation human factors and human
error have been well documented in aviation incidents and accidents over the last two
decades and the San Francisco Asiana Flight 214 crash is a great example. The new
2017 SHELL Model in Fig. 2 depicts computer automation and information in all four
interfaces of the SHELL and these computer innovations have been responsible for
making aviation extremely safe and efficient in the last 20 years. The downside to these
technological enhancements are those rare cases where computer/human factors cau-
sations line up causing human error from those SHELL interfaces and cause an incident
or a rare accident. Some of the most common causes of computer-Liveware (L) error
seen the most by the industry are: (1) Complacency in relying on computers, (2) Not
understanding the computers, (3) Overly Focused on a computer and distracted from
flying, and (4) Optical inside only with little outward scanning. In the Asiana Flight
214 crash, the pilots became complacent in the Liveware (L)-Hardware (H) and relied
on their computer system to do the landings instead of being proficient at manual
landings while using the computer and auto-throttles to help improve the manual
landings [4]. They fell short in the Liveware (L)-Liveware (L) interface where they
needed to be able to cross check normal landing checkpoints of altitude and airspeed to
correct sooner when too low on glideslope and communicate this through good ACRM.
In the Liveware (L) – Environment (E) interface they ignored the GPWS too long as
they needed to be able to manually do a missed approach sooner in the landing. In the
Liveware (L)-Hardware (H) interface the pilots also had a difficult time understanding
the idiosyncrasies of the auto throttle system. By using proper ACRM training tech-
niques like task Management and assertiveness, other members of the crew could have
participated and even challenged the wrong auto throttle setting and possibly prevented
the accident. In the Liveware (L)-Hardware (H) interface, when the computer tech-
nology is not working, the crew must be able to confirm the malfunction and asser-
tively take the proper course of action. Lastly, from the Liveware (L)-Software
(S) interface, the Asiana crew had become so reliant on the computer systems to land
the aircraft safely that they focused more on their computers inside the cockpit then on
basic landing parameters; the most important being the runway glide slope monitor
telling them to execute a missed approach sooner. To avoid these errors with com-
puters, pilots still need to aviate, navigate and communicate while scanning outside to
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use the runway and inside while still flying with the computer automation and infor-
mation. They need to task delegate with the computers by being more human centered
and managing the computer systems to fly the aircraft instead of being computer
centered and letting the computer fly them.
4 The SHELL 2017 and the Potential Human Factors
Cognition Issue
The NTSB recognized many different factors as the Probable cause in this Asiana
Flight 214 accident. Usually one or two Probable Causes covers the main cause of
NTSB Aviation Accident investigative reports, but the case of Asiana Flight 214 was
different. The probable cause of the Asiana Flight 214 accident was determined by the
NTSB to be the flight crew’s mismanagement of the airplane’s descent during the
visual approach, the flying pilot’s unintended deactivation of automatic airspeed
control, the flight crew’s inadequate monitoring of the airspeed, and the flight crew’s
delayed execution of a go-around after they became aware that the airplane was below
acceptable glide path and airspeed tolerances [4]. These NTSB Probable Causes are all
valid, but when looking at them from the SHELL model in 2017 the underlying cause
of human factors cognition also needs to be addressed.
4.1 Cognitive Processing
The added interactions among SHELL 2017 components are largely cognitive. This
involves considerably more continuous information processing, which suggests the
potential for overload at some point. As stated earlier, Liveware activity in the SHELL
framework is changing to readouts and text. With this evolution, and the emphasis on
optical tasks, it is imperative to keep the pilot scan of the displays and instruments in
continual engagement. As shown in Fig. 2, what may have been embedded and
non-visualized software now requires more focused pilot attention, optical processing,
and cognitive processing to understand the plethora of dynamic information presented.
When pilots must look up and through the windscreen, the optical flow changes to
actual external cues and associated cognitive processing to comprehend what is hap-
pening and the relevance to flight parameters. To some degree, use of head-up display
symbology is similar to the screens used, and is consistent with the cognitive pro-
cessing underway. However, real-world visual cues, particularly in non-standard events
quickly overloads the pilot. Synthetic vision can introduce real world and virtual
representations in the same display, which will consume far more neural resources in
combination. The cognition difficulties inherent in the SHELL 2017 interfaces are both
combinatorial and concatenated. These might best be illustrated with Gestalt perception
principles [5]. For example, the combinatorial effects are seen with proximity (SHELL
clouds approach overlapping), closure (premature conclusions), and primacy (initial
optical indication). Concatenation effects are evident in the principle of continuation
(current trajectory will continue). Cognitive processing clouds represented in the
SHELL 2017 illustrations show these principles and their role in cognitive loading and
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potential for cognitive error. The SHELL process is essentially linear, and the original
model did not initially contemplate simultaneous, multi-dimensional interfaces and
interactions among the SHELL components. Consequently, as the optical and cognitive
loads have increased with digitization, a concatenation effect can occur where infor-
mation from one SHELL domain attaches to a second domain, and continues to build
until the pilot either becomes confused or may reach a faulty conclusion or determine
incorrectly a need for action. This can lead to one of the three forms of cognitive error
[6]: faulty synthesis involving flawed processing of available information (with pre-
mature closure the most common element), faulty knowledge, and faulty data gath-
ering. To assess the significant involvement of cognitive processing represented in the
SHELL 2017 architecture, neural functions are key to understanding the safety
implications. Prefrontal cortex connects in some fashion with every level of activity in
the brain. In this regard, long-term memories distributed throughout inter-connected
neural pathways are subject to disruption or rerouting as a result of excess beta wave
activity. If a pilot becomes anxious when overcome with information from the cog-
nitive clouds seen in SHELL 2017, this type of disruption occurs. An associated
transmitter, acetylcholine, is highly involved in attentional processes, alpha wave
production, and is influential in neural processing flow. When alpha wave activity is
deficient, the brain lacks sufficient mental speed to connect perceptions and thoughts
[7]. Thus, situations that require escalating optical activities, as SHELL 2017 has
illustrated, add to the load placed on the prefrontal areas.
4.2 Cognitive Flow
When considering the varying functions and intentions of each SHELL component, the
combined effects require synchronous neural processing. To achieve this process,
information and associated neural actions must flow freely. This flow, however, is
easily disrupted and affects intra-neural communication creating an imbalance in the
brain’s systems [8]. Flow relies on sustained attention to processing demands and a
mental sequencing, or map, of what is required to complete actions with rapid updating
of working memory [9]. Bowers et al. [10] demonstrated a strikingly different pattern
associated with moving between tasks that would indicate post-workload transition
effects might manifest with onset of a high level of workload. This is at the heart of the
SHELL process. This is precisely the situation when the pilots must integrate the
cognitive content and synthesize flow among the various SHELL components.
A workload transition, such as shifting within the SHELL 2017 domains, constitutes a
shift in cognitive task difficulty and could likely result in an increase in missed events
or significant flight dimensions as described by the hysteresis effect which has been
attributed to cognitive resource depletion [11]. Among perceptual tasks with SHELL
2017 is constructing a cognitive map of the operating environment and interacting
influences. Recent findings [12] verified that neurons in the brain related to
space-mapping react to virtual environments differently from the real world. The
hippocampus is recruited when a person develops a cognitive map of the environment,
including calculation of distances and space, and is further mediated through the post
rhinal and entorhinal cortex. In virtual environments, results showed that as much as
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half the hippocampal neurons usually involved were actually shut down and the
cognitive map was nonexistent. The implications for pilots are profound. This suggests
a different region of the brain is involved in the spatial learning tasks and processes,
compared with reduced digitalization, and is complicated when perceptual variances
become intertwined (one using virtual cues and the other real-world cues). The
implications for SHELL 2017 are that the cognitive areas encroaching the component
boundaries are increasingly subject to perceptual disparities that consume evermore
resources and deplete neural energy rapidly [13]. Combinations of virtual and real
world perceptual input among the SHELL 2017 components acts directly upon this
hippocampal processing with attendant reductions in comprehension by pilots. Taken
together, the optical processing demands, coupled with cognitive processing functions,
place a notable load upon the pilot. When combined perceptions and multidimensional
interfaces are added, there is a likely potential for cognitive disruption. What becomes
sacrificed, then, are cognitive maps and continuity of processing. These introduce the
phenomenon of cognitive loading, which is examined next.
4.3 Cognitive Loading
The concept of cognitive loading was introduced in 1988 and developed further by
Chandler and Sweller [14]. As the term came into use for attention and memory
applications, references to information processing became prominent with particular
emphasis on perception, memory, and reasoning. The amygdalae are constantly
scanning incoming information to determine potentials for safety risks. Increased
scanning activity, as with the SHELL 2017 cognitive tasks, has the potential to elevate
conscious awareness of perceived threats. As is well known, the amygdalae can
dominate the neocortex and obstruct clear thinking when most needed [15]. Related
neural function is contained in the concept of continuous partial attention which is a
compromised state of focus due to attending many information streams at the same
time. This is directly indicated in the growing cognitive task clouds of SHELL 2017,
and can lead to infoglut from continuously increasing information contexts. The
concept of working memory developed by Baddeley [16] has proven robust and is
widely accepted as a useful model for understanding how brief memory operates. As he
described it, working memory is the cognitive process that allows moment-to-moment
perceptions across time to be integrated, rehearsed, and combined with simultaneous
access to stored information about previous experience, actions, or knowledge. As for
the encoding aspect of the arriving and cycling information, proteins in the prefrontal
cortex are essential to keeping optical tasks and neural processing active. As additional
messages are added, the replenishment of synthesized protein is inhibited or dimin-
ished, thereby causing loss of some of the cycling elements active in working memory
[17], which happens when strings of working memory connected with the SHELL
2017 tasks are compromised and no longer intact. Drawing upon the model developed
by Baddeley for working memory, and including recent findings for bandwidth issues
and protein cycling limits, it is apparent that pilots operating in the realm of SHELL
2017 cognitive loading can reach saturation of working memory buffering. Pilots in a
digitized cockpit often are working with multiple screens and monitors. As would be
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expected, the visual component of perception is subject to saturation from stimuli and
data. Accompanying visual input is the need to interpret the significance or urgency of
the information. Perceiving what is critical, what is evolving, and sequences for actions
becomes paramount. An element associated with reducing stress is the ability to resolve
conflicts as they arise. A resulting uncertainty with regard to conflict resolution can
occur between two states such as GPWS alert (L-E interface) and EFB map (L-S
interface). While cognitive memory is generally mediated in the anterior hippocampi,
affective memory is processed via the amygdalae. Often, amygdala-driven memories
can take precedence in neural sequencing. For some pilots, amygdala-level situational
appraisal may invite distorted pattern recognition and proneness to false alarms [18].
When considering automation influences between open-loop and closed-loop interac-
tions, issues related to SHELL 2017 cognitive loading become evident. Evidence
reported in a study [19] of nearly 2,000 pilots flying aircraft with advanced automation
systems showed pilots described differences in “flying through the computer, which
required more self-discipline, lags in anticipating aircraft behavior, and increased
monitoring of mode annunciations. Each of these conditions increases the vigilance
pilots direct to the cognitive tasks in the expanded SHELL 2017 environment. In our
examination of SHELL 2017 effects, information being encoded from multiple related
sources in an interactive interface can present a delta gap effect which delays correctly
understanding the implications of the information received. As the cycling working
memory elements from several SHELL domains are attempting to cross-communicate
among various neural processing centers, the lag in neural responding and accurate
information integration can be profound [20]. Consequently, when cross-neuralization
is challenged (as in combined SHELL 2017 cognitive activities) – a delta gap may
apply, with signal lag among brain components responding to inquiries from other
brain sending locations. Potential for confusion, slowed comprehension, and related
cognitive functions increases accordingly. With cognitive shifts from closed loop to
open loop processing into the SHELL 2017 architecture, the pilot is likely to be cycling
two or more scenarios in working memory, with rehearsal and encoding challenges
continually involved to comprehend flight maneuvers and anticipated next steps.
Where level of automation is not a significant factor, what has become evident is that
although mental resources are not always completely expended for primary tasks, the
presence of competing demands from secondary task components can strain the pri-
mary functions to the point of saturation [10]. It has been demonstrated that working
memory deficits involving increased dopamine levels caused by stress can occur [9].
The obvious implications for SHELL 2017 are that, should pilots become confused or
anxious, working memory deficits could manifest. Likewise, calcium sensitive kinases,
calcineurin, and dephosphorylation have been shown as detrimental to working
memory and are in evidence during high visual task loadings [21]. When neural pro-
cessing capacities are exceeded, with particular reference to the digitized cockpit
environment, degraded situational awareness and various cognitive errors may ensue.
Further, this disrupts the prospective memory and remaining ahead of related incoming
information from other components of the SHELL interactive process.
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4.4 Situational Awareness
Research on mental workload, and especially overload, has focused on situational
awareness, information processing, and decision making where they are simultaneously
present. When too high or too low, cognitive load increases risk of error, more notably
when abrupt bursts of a large amount of information must be processed quickly [22].
This would likely occur, for instance, during unanticipated events and rapidly changing
information flow in the digitized cockpit environment. Correspondingly, the outcome
manifests as a cognitive loading challenge. The researchers found that the nature of a
non-linear task environment, like that with SHELL 2017, stimulated operator concerns
about future states of the system. The SHELL 2017 domain has advanced the optical
interactions significantly. Accompanying the optical loading, interaction effects can be
expected. Endsley [23] describes situational awareness (SA) as a working memory
bottleneck for pilots in novel situations. For more experienced pilots with skilled per-
formance capabilities, increased recruitment of long term memory augments the SA
process and results in fewer gaps or performance decrement. Consequently, the volume
of mental processing to sustain high levels of SA require pilot access to embedded
mental constructs in long term memory. Such increased and sustained activity would
clearly result in a more rapid consumption rate of available brain glucose necessary for
effective functioning. Protein that is fueling working and prospective memory is
depleted rapidly [21]. A study of pilot decision making [24] affirmed that in low tempo
operations extra cognitive resources are available, however, when uncommon or
emergency events occur pilot time for reflection is substantially reduced. Consequences
result in the need for understanding that the changed situation has compromised the
system status. The researchers identified several cognitive breakdowns that occurred:
delay in comprehending an event was occurring, fragmented scan of information
sources, narrowed assessment, inability to commit to a course of action, and failure to
re-check new courses of action to assure implementation as intended. As digital cockpit
pilots become loaded near maximum working memory capacity, during especially
challenging flight maneuvers or unanticipated procedures, deferring critical actions
could be catastrophic. As the SHELL 2017 model illustrates, multiple, simultaneous
optical processing tasks must be attended to and integrated with current flight parameters
and aircraft systems. When exceeded, neural capacities become strained and, along with
incipient cognitive error, mode confusion can result. This has a history, as highlighted in
the Australian study of pilots [25] which also confirmed that workarounds highjacked
cognitive resources. As optical processing demands have increased, many pilots view
the flight management computer as more competent than themselves.
5 Conclusions
In summary, the SHELL 2017 representation reflects the combined influences of
optical processing demands on pilots, and the related cognitive loading challenges
associated with the proliferation of similar cognitive tasks within each SHELL domain.
Efforts to contain or reduce cognitive error suggest better training for pilots so they are
aware of potential environments that contribute to error. Other efforts are more within
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the adaptive automation spectrum to recognize potential error and adjust flight com-
putations accordingly. Further assessment of the similarities and differences of cog-
nitive demands within each SHELL domain is indicated to more thoroughly understand
how to gain efficiencies and to reduce potential for unintended errors based on cog-
nitive misperceptions.
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